
# Is Usable Privacy-Preserving Data Analysis an Oxymoron?

Liina Kamm



# **Processing personal data**


ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
49401223576	Valli Vaarikas	27	F	194	90	135	146	95






#### **Processing data**

- What kind of data do I have?
- Where are they kept?
- What do I want to do with them?
- Where will they move in the process?
- Who is going to see them?




#### Privacy-complexity trade-off





#### Comparison of the technologies



<sup>\*</sup>Not all of these technologies are useful or relevant for all use-cases



#### **Pseudonymisation**

Pseudonymisation is the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.


(GDPR, art. 4(5))



## **Pseudonymisation**



ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
49403136525	Mari Maasikas	27	F	165	75	110	122	75
39507082997	Ants Õun	25	М	165	85	162	132	88
49401223576	Valli Vaarikas	27	F	194	90	135	146	95
•••	•••		•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••





code	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
HYP_01		27	F	165	75	110	122	75
HYP_02		25	М	165	85	162	132	88
HYP_03		27	F	194	90	135	146	95
			•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••



#### **Anonymisation**

Anonymisation is a process by which personal data is irreversibly altered in such a way that a data subject can no longer be identified directly or indirectly, either by the data controller alone or in collaboration with any other party.

(ISO/TS 25237:2017)



#### **Anonymisation process**

- In general it is not enough to simply remove an individual's identifiers
- Quasi-identifiers combinations of attributes relating to an individual
- The process of anonymisation is final and it should not be possible to reverse this
- Whether an individual data item can be considered anonymous or not requires case-by-case evaluation



#### **Anonymisation**



ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
49403136525	Mari Maasikas	27	F	165	65	110	122	75
39507082997	Ants Õun	25	М	165	85	162	132	88
49401223576	Valli Vaarikas	27	F	194	90	135	146	95
•••	•••		•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••

Anonymisation Anonymisation

										agc	SCA	D.V	1198	Syst	aidot
age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	sex	kg	Hgb	syst	d	27	F	23,9	110	122	75
27	F	165	75	110	F	75	110	122	7	25	М	31,2	162	132	88
25	М	165	85	162	М	85	162	132	8		F		135		95
-	_	_	_	_	F	90	135	146		27	F	23,9		120	70
27	F	165	75	122	F	90	135	120	7		М	•			99
25	M	165	85	183	М	85	183	142		27		31,2	183		
25	IVI	103	00	100	F	75	122	130	8	2/	F	23,9	122	130	85
•••	•••	•••	•••	•••		, 0	122	100		•••	•••	•••		•••	•••
					•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••

#### Pseudonymisation and anonymisation


- Pseudonymised data are not anonymised data
- Pseudonymisation: existence of an association between personal identifiers and pseudonyms. Re-identification is possible, data is personal data
- Anonymisation: such an association should not be available by any means, re-identification is not possible, data is not personal data
- Anonymised data do not qualify as personal data
- "Anonymous" in common language also describes cases where the identities of individuals are only hidden



#### Federated statistics and federated learning




ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast





ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast





#### Synthetic data generation

Synthetic data has been generated from real data and has the same statistical properties as real data.

Synthetic data is not real data.\*

\* Depends on the strength of the synthesis algrithm and from the perspective of legislation and data protection, it is not yet binding


Khaled El Emam, Lucy Mosquera, Richard Hoptroff "Practical Synthetic Data Generation". O'Reilly 2020.




# Data synthesis using real data



code	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
HYP_01		27	F	165	75	110	122	75
HYP_02		25	М	165	85	162	132	88
HYP_03		27	F	194	90	135	146	95
		•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••





age	sex	age	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
26	М	165	80	156	122	75
27	F	165	80	110	133	88
28	F	195	95	132	142	92
	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••





#### Trusted execution environments

In the central processing unit (CPU), trusted execution environments are secure subprocesses (enclaves), into which other processes cannot see


Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), ARM TrustZone, iPhone Secure Element



#### **Trusted execution environments**



	ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
	49403136525	Mari Maasikas	27	F	165	75	110	122	75
١	39507082997	Ants Õun	25	М	165	85	162	132	88
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	•••			•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	• • •



ID	name	age	sex	cm	kg	Hgb	syst	diast
jablkhsjhbfd	lfknlekfnasyd	kjsfb	sdfkj	dbid	scbs	wpal	pfbm	anbf
djsbfkhbfsih	adphfguydla	dkjb	dkjb	sdnh	sklk	qlsk	qkdn	Stys
fljkshasdans	dlfkjbnabdua	dlfja	dkbd	nuyg	snby	qpkd	aknd	fhva
•••	•••		•••	•••	•••	•••	•••	•••




#### **Example of a TEE**

## **CLIENT APPLICATION**

Sharemind HI client library

#### SHAREMIND HI APPLICATION SERVER






#### Secure multi-party computation

Several **independent** parties compute a function based on all input data, without knowing the input values of other parties. The output is revealed only to authorised parties.



#### Secure multi-party computation





#### Secure multi-party computation and ML

- Possible to link databases
- Sufficient privacy protection measures
- Preserves privacy of individuals
- High computational overhead for certain methods
  - But what would the administrative overhead be?



#### Secure multi-party ML in action

- Sharemind MPC has side-channel safe algorithms from linear regression to XGBoost
- User-friendly R-like interface (Rmind)
- Manageable overhead (except for XGBoost on large datasets)
- LASSO logistic regression shows promise
- Demonstrated for neural network evaluation
- Simple MPC is not feasible for neural network training
  - Could be done in a federated manner



#### Case study: using Sharemind MPC for ML



Predicting the hospitalisation of chronically ill patients



More frequent checkups could reduce the number of hospitalisations



Medical data of 130k individuals (age, gender, clinical observations, procedures, measurements, doctor visits, prescription info); up to 25M entries in one table.



#### Preprocessing and model training

Preprocessing 1: Select people with chronical illnesses (e.g., diabetes, hypertonia), people with cancer diagnoses are excluded.

Preprocessing 2: Link and clean data. Outputs a single table with around 150k rows and 500 columns.

Normalising and splitting data: Normalise data and split into training and test set.

**Training:** Train logistic regression and LASSO logistic regression models on the data



#### Results and benchmarks

For training, we used different model algorithms and hyperparameters.

We experimented with floating-point and fixed-point numbers.

Preprocessing: ~80 hours

Best training (LASSO logistic regression): ~22 hours

#### Results (AUC):

Sharemind MPC (LASSO Logistic Regression)	Without Sharemind MPC (XGBoost)	Without Sharemind MPC (LASSO logistic regression)
0.709	0.727	0.687



# Thank you!

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